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THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYERS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS UNDER
THE RECOGNITION-CERTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF
THE FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS ACT
CHARLEs B. CRAvER* and RUSSELL W. LA PEER"

In 1968 the State of Florida adopted a revised constitution containing a
provision' that presaged the right of public employees to engage in collective
bargaining. 2 Although the language of article I, section 6 was vague concerning the specific rights granted to public employees, the Florida supreme court
expeditiously interpreted the new provision to provide governmental workers
with meaningful, although limited, representation privileges. In Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Association v. Ryan3 the court held "that with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by Section 6." 4 However,
*B.S. 1967, Cornell University; M. Ind. & Labor Rel. 1968, Cornell University School of
Industrial and Labor Relations; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Florida; Member, The California Bar. As Special Consultant to the
Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), Mr. Craver drafted the proposed
Rules and Regulations for the implementation and application of the Public Employees

Relations Act (PERA).
**A.B., 1969, Eastern Michigan University; MA., 1970, Wheaton College; J.D., 1975, University of Florida; Member, The Florida Bar.
1. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §6 provides: "Right to Work- The right of persons to work shall
not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor
union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the
right to strike." See also N.J. CONsr.art. I, §19.
Florida is one of the few jurisdictions in the United States that constitutionally guarantees
public employees collective bargaining rights. This factor may place an important limitation
upon the right of the Florida Legislature or PERO to restrict unduly the organizing and
negotiating rights of public employees. Cf. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
2. Prior to 1968 public employees in Florida apparently did not possess the right to
engage in true collective bargaining with their governmental employers., See Miami Water
Works Local 564 v. City of Miami, 26 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1946); Longshoremen's Local 1526 v.
Broward County Port Authority, 183 So. 2d 257 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Dade County v.
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963), appeal dismissed, 166 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965).
See also 1961-1962 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 428; 1959-1960 FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL

REP. 241, 246-47. But see Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1968), wherein the court, in dictum, inexplicably indicated
that former Fla. Stat. §839.221(2) (1969), see note 7 infra, which had been enacted in 1959,
granted public employees "the right to bargain as a member of a union or labor organization .... " See McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Florida-Past,Present
and Future, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 26, 34-40 (1973); Comment, Labor Relations; Public School
Teachers, The Right To Strike and Collectively Bargain, 21 U. FI.. L. RV.403, 404-05

(1969).
3. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
4. Id. at 905. The court examined the legislative history surrounding the adoption of

•

.:.
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despite the well recognized right under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),5 of a labor organization selected by a majority of private sector employees in an appropriate bargaining unit to be the exclusive representative of
all the workers in that unit,6 the Ryan court construed Florida Statutes, section 839.221(2) 7 as limiting the negotiation right of a public employee union
to the representation of only those workers who had specifically designated it
as their bargaining agent.8
The Florida supreme court recognized that article I, section 6, even when
read in conjunction with section 839.221(2), did not provide the substantive
definition and procedural rules necessary to implement fully the intent expressed in the revised constitution. The court urged the legislature to fill the
void.9 In 1972, after several years of legislative inaction, the court indicated
that if the legislature did not enact provisions defining the collective bargaining rights of public employees in the near future, the court would be forced
to establish the requisite guidelines itself.10 Finally, in 1974, the Florida Legislature passed the Public Employees Relations Act (PERA). 11
The PERA created the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC),12
which is responsible for the effectuation and administration of that enactment.
It is empowered to protect the statutory labor rights of public employees 3 by

article I, §6, and concluded that "the Legislature intended both private and public employees to be included in the word 'employees' in the second sentence of Section 6." Id. at
905 n.l. For a good discussion of the pertinent legislative history, see McGuire, supra note 2,
at 42-44 n.64.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§151-68 (1970). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW (C. Morris ed. 1971).
6. 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1970). See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180
(1967); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332, 339 (1944). See generally Craver, Minority Action Versus Union Exclusivity: The
Need To HarmonizeNLRA and Title VII Policies, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29-32 (1974).
7. Former Fla. Stat. §839.221(2) (1969) provided: "All employees who comply with the
provisions of this section [dealing with illegal strike activity or support] are assured the
right and freedom of association, self-organization, and the right to join or to continue as
members of any employee or labor organization which complies with this section, and shall
have the right to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment
through representatives of their own choosing. No such employee shall be discharged or
discriminated against because of his exercise of such right, nor shall any person or group of
persons, directly or indirectly, by intimidation or coercion, compel or attempt to compel any
such employee to join or refrain from joining a vocational or a labor organization."
This section was repealed by the PERA, FLA. STAT. §§447.201 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
8. 225 So. 2d at 906. It should be noted that this portion of the Dade County Classroom
Teachers' Ass'n decision has been substantially affected by the PERA, which expressly provides public employee labor organizations with exclusive repersentation rights similar to
those granted to majority unions under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See FLA.
STAT. §447.307(3)(b) (Supp. 1974).
9. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1969).
10. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 687-88 (Fla.
1972).
11. FLA. STAT. §§447.201 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
12. FLA. STAT. §447.205 (Supp. 1974).
13. See FLA. STAT. §§447.205, .301 (Supp. 1974) (protected rights of public employees).
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enforcing provisions proscribing unfair labor practices by employers1 4 and
labor organizations.' The Commission is also authorized to resolve all questions concerning the representational claims of labor organizations.
Section 447.307(6)6 delineates two methods by which an employee organi-

zation may obtain certification from PERC as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of a defined group of public employees. If a public employer is willing to concede that a particular employee organization has been
designated by the majority of workers in an appropriate bargaining unit 17 to
represent them for collective bargaining purposes, it may voluntarily extend
recognition, thus permitting the organization to petition PERC for certifica14. See FLA. STAT. §447.501(1) (Supp. 1974) (employer unfair labor practices).
15. See FLA. STAT. §447.501(2) (Supp. 1974) (unfair labor practices of labor organizations).
I6.FLA. STAT. §447.307 (Supp. 1974), provides in relevant part:
"(1) Any employee organization which is designated or selected by a majority of public
employees in an appropriate unit as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining
shall request recognition by the public employer. The public employer shall, if satisfied as
to the majority status of the employee organization and the appropriateness of the proposed
unit, recognize the employee organization as the collective bargaining representative of employees in the designated unit. Upon recognition by a public employer, the employee organization shall immediately petition the commission for certification. The commission shall review only the appropriateness of the unit proposed by the employee organization. If the
unit is appropriate according to the criteria used in this part, the commission shall immediately certify the employee organization as the exclusive representative of all employees
in the unit.
"(2) If the public employer refuses to recognize the employee organization the employee
organization may file a petition with the commission for certification as the bargaining agent
for a proposed bargaining unit. The petition shall be accompanied by dated statements
signed by at least thirty (30) percent of the employees in the proposed unit indicating that
such employees desire to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the petitioning employee organization. Any employee, employers or employee organization having sufficient reason to believe any of the employee signatures were obtained by collusion, coercion,
intimidation or misrepresentation or are otherwise invalid shall be given a reasonable opportunity to verify and challenge the signatures appearing on the petition.
"(3)(a) The commission or one of its designated agents shall investigate the petition to
determine its sufficiency; if it has reasonable cause to believe that the petition is sufficient,
the commission shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such a hearing
may be conducted by an agent of the commission, who shall not make any recommendations
with respect thereto. If the commission finds upon the record of the hearing that the petition is sufficient, it shall immediately:
"I.Define the proposed bargaining unit and determine which public employees shall be
qualified and entitled to vote at any election held by the commission;
"2. Identify the public employer or employers for purposes of collective bargaining with
the bargaining agent;
"8. Order an election by secret ballot.... (b) Where an employee organization is selected
by a majority of the employees voting in an election, the commission shall certify the employee organization as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees in
the unit. (c) In any election in which none of the choices on the ballot receives the vote
of a majority of the employees voting, a run-off election shall be held according to rules
promulgated by the commission. (d) No new election may be conducted in any appropriate
bargaining unit to determine the exclusive representative if a representative election has
been conducted within the preceding twelve month period."
17. See FA. STAT. §447.807(4) (Supp. 1974) (factors to be utilized by PERC when determining whether a proposed unit is appropriate for negotiation purposes).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

tion.18 However, where a labor organization is unable to obtain voluntary
recognition from the governmental employer, it must seek certification through
a secret ballot election.19
Since there is no established body of decisional law interpreting the recently enacted PERA, the initial cases confronting the Commission will require it to define the appropriate parameters of the various sections of the
Act before it can apply those provisions to the specific fact situations presented. PERC, however, will not be forced to interpret the PERA in a vacuum.
The relevant sections of the Florida Act are quite similar to those found in
the NLRA, and the Florida supreme court has indicated that in such circumstances the decisions interpreting such analogous legislation should be highly
persuasive in Florida.2
Several of the early cases that have arisen under the PERA have focused
upon the interpretation and application of sections 447.307(1) and (2).21 In
three representation cases public employers raised issues under those provisions
requiring the Commission to delineate the prerequisite obligations of labor
organizations seeking collective bargaining certification from PERC. In a
fourth case, involving an unfair labor practice charge filed against a governmental employer, an employee organization requested that the Commission
define the statutory duties of a public employer presented with a demand for
collective bargaining recognition by a union claiming to have majority support among the workers in an allegedly appropriate unit.
This article will examine the cases and decisions that have arisen under
sections 447.307(1) and (2). In addition, decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concerning similar labor issues that have arisen in the
private sector will be discussed in an effort to suggest the approach that should
be taken under the PERA with respect to recognition and certification cases.
PERC CASES
Representation Cases
In each of the three pertinent representation cases 22 a certification petition
had been filed by a labor organization requesting a secret ballot election to
determine whether it should be certified by PERC as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the proposed unit. On January 21, 1975, the
State of Florida, the governmental employer, filed motions to dismiss the three

18. FLA. STAT. §447.307(1) (Supp. 1974). Where such voluntary recognition has been accorded a labor organization by a public employer, PERC is merely empowered to review the
appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. See note 16 supra.
19. FLA. STAT. §447.307(2) (Supp. 1974); see note 16 supra.
20. See, e.g., State v. Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1974); Flammer v. Patton, 245
So. 2d 854, 859 (Fla. 1971).
21. FLA. STAT. §§447.307(l)-(2) (Supp. 1974); see note 16 supra.
22. State of Florida & Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Case No. 8H-RC-746-2026;
State of Florida, G. Pierce Wood State Mental Hosp., Case No. 8H-RC-741-0026; State of
Florida, Sumter Correctional Institution, Case No. 8H-RC-741-0023.
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petitions.23 The state claimed that the three labor organizations had failed to
demand voluntary recognition from the employer prior to the filing of their

respective petitions and contended that, under sections 447.307(l) and (2), they
were required to request such recognition as a statutory prerequisite to their
right to petition PERC for a certification election. The motions to dismiss
were accompanied by affidavits from the acting personnel director of the State
Department of Administration, averring that in none of the three cases had he

received a request for voluntary recognition from the petitioning labor organization since the effective date of the PERA.
In State of Florida, G. Pierce Wood State Mental Hospital,24 although
the certification petition filed by the petitioning labor organization indicated that a request for voluntary recognition had been made on the date
the PERA became fully operative, no affidavits or other documents were filed
contesting the contrary assertion contained in the state's affidavit. It should
also be noted that while. the proposed bargaining unit comprised approximately 850 employees, the petition indicated that only 337 authorization cards
had been signed in support of the union. Similar circumstances were present
in State of Florida& FloridaPolice Benevolent Association,25 where the petitioning employee organization also claimed to have made a timely request for
recognition from the public employer, but failed to file any document controverting the state's affidavit. Furthermore, the evidence indicated that in the
originally proposed bargaining unit the labor organization had no more than
46 per cent employee support. The third representation case, State of Florida,
Sumter CorrectionalInstitution,26 involved similar facts. The petitioning labor
union claimed to have requested voluntary recognition in a timely manner,
but it too failed to present documentation challenging the state's affidavit. In
addition, the union claimed to possess authorization cards from only 70 of the
almost 200 employees in the-proposed unit.
The three cases were consolidated for hearing. In the Sumter Correctional
Institution case,27 the PERC general counsel filed a memorandum opposing the
state's dismissal motion. 28 It contended that any requirement that might exist
under sections 447.307(1) and (2) obligating a petitioning labor organization
to request voluntary recognition as a prerequisite to its right to file a certification petition seeking a representation election should not be applicable to a
union that does not possess cards evidencing majority employee support, since
other PERA provisions prohibit the extension of voluntary recognition to a
nonmajority labor organization. 29 Despite the opposition of the general coun23. State of Florida, Sumter Correctional Institution, Dec. No. 75E-3-25 (April 22, 1975);
State of Florida, G. Pierce Wood State Mental Hosp., Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975);
State of Florida &Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Dec. No. 75E-I-5 (April 15, 1975).
24. Case No. 8H-RC-741-0025, Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975).
25. Case No. 8H-RC-746-2026, Dec. No. 75E-1-5 (April 15,1975).
26. Case No. 8H-RC-741-0023, Dec. No. 75E-3-25 (April 22, 1975).
27.

Id.

28. Memorandum for PERC General Counsel in State of Florida, Sumter Correctional
Institution, Case No. 8H-RC-741-0023.
29. See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra.
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sel, the Commission granted the dismissal motions in all three cases. It
unanimously ruled that, under sections 447.307(1) and (2), a request for
voluntary recognition was a statutorily imposed condition precedent to the
filing of a petition asking for a certification election and determined that the
three petitioner labor organizations had failed to demonstrate that they had
made the requisite demand for recognition.3"
On February 25, 1975, the PERC general counsel petitioned the Commission for clarification of the three dismissals. 31 The motion was based upon
the fact that PERC had not, when it orally announced its dismissal decisions, clearly indicated whether the voluntary recognition request prerequisite to the filing of a representation election petition was applicable both to
unions that have been able to obtain only minority employee support and to
those enjoying majority support.32 The Commission granted the general
counsel's motion. Following oral argument, PERC reaffirmed the dismissals of
the G. Pierce Wood State Mental Hospital33 and Police Benevolent Association34 cases. However, the Commission reversed its dismissal of the
Sumter CorrectionalInstitution petition, holding that "a labor group selected
by less than a majority of public employees in the proposed unit need not
make a written demand to the public employer for recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for a proposed unit as a condition precedent for
filing a representation petition ... ,."5 PERC concluded: "To require a
[minority] group . .. to use the same procedures of section [447.307(1)] that a
group with at least a fifty percent showing of interest must use would be to
require excessive delay in the exercise by a minority group of a constitutional
right to collectively bargain."3 6 Since the petition filed in Sumter Correctional
Institution clearly indicated that the labor organization in question did not
possess majority support, it was relieved of the recognition demand prerequisite, which the Commission ruled was applicable only with respect to unions
having majority support.37
30. Dec. Nos. 75E-3-25; 75E-4-26; 75E-1-5 (1975). Although the Commission orally voted
to grant the requested dismissals on Feb. 14, 1975, based upon the stated principle, no formal
written orders were issued, since on Feb. 25, 1975, the General Counsel filed a Motion for
Clarification of the above dismissals, which was granted. As a result, rehearing by the Commission was ordered before any written orders were provided.
31. Motion for Clarification filed by PERC General Counsel, Case Nos. 8H-RC-764-2026;

8H-RC-741-0023; 8H-RC-741-0025.
32. "The Commission appeared to indicate both a majority and minority union [sic] are
required to make a similar demand. It was not clear from the decision under what circumstances a demand would be a prerequisite to the filing of a Petition." Id. at 2.
33. Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975).
34. Dec. No. 75E-1-5 (April 15, 1975).
35. Dec. No. 75E-3-25 (April 22, 1975), at 2.
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. It is informative to note that in upholding the dismissal pertaining to the G. Pierce
Wood State Mental Hospital case, the Commission did not require proof by the state that
the petitioning labor organization actually enjoyed majority employee support. It instead
indicated that it would be incumbent upon a petitioning union that had not satisfied the
voluntary recognition request prerequisite to affirmatively assert that it did not have majority
support. The Commission stated: "Nowhere on its petition for a representation election did
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Unfair Labor PracticeCase
On January 24, 1975, an unfair labor practice charge was filed with PERC38
requesting a delineation of the obligations of a public employer under sections 447.307(1) and (2) of the PERA. The labor organization filing the
charge had requested voluntary recognition from the city of Winter Park,
based upon its submission of authorization cards signed by 51 of the 54 employees in the proposed bargaining unit. The governmental employer had
refused to examine the evidence provided by the union to establish its claim
of majority support and had rejected the request for voluntary recognition,
precipitating the unfair labor practice charge.3 9 .
The PERC general counsel dismissed the charge, concluding that sections
447.307(1) and. (2), even when read in conjunction with section 447.501(l)(c),
did not impose a duty upon a public employer to investigate a union's claim
of majority support.40 Therefore, the refusal by the city of Winter Park to
accede to the union's request for voluntary recognition did not ipso facto
constitute an unfair labor practice.41 The labor organization involved appealed the dismissal decision to the Commission 4 2 which decided to reinstate
the unfair labor practice charge and order the issuance of a complaint,43 thus
providing an opportunity for a resolution on the merits of the case.
By analyzing the issues raised in the four PERG cases heretofore discussed,
and by extrapolating to other related areas of inquiry, it should be possible
to review sections 447.307(l) and (2) as well as other interconnected PERA
provisions, in order to evaluate the manner in which those provisions should

be interpreted and applied.
ANALYSIS OF

PERA

PROVISIONS IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES

OF LAW ESTABLISHED UNDER THE

NLRA

Public sector labor relations enactments generally have been patterned
after the NLRA 44 which has protected the organizational and collective
the Organization assert that the requirement of a request for recognition was inapplicable.
Nowhere did it affirmatively show less than majority status. Although the number of signatures on the attached cards was clearly less than a majority of employees in the proposed
unit, there was no indication on the petition that the Organization had submitted all its
cards." Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975), at 2.
38. City of Winter Park, Case No. 8H-CA-756-2019.
39. The charging party contended that the City of Winter Park, by its refusal to afford
it the requested bargaining recognition, breached its statutory collective bargaining obligations under FLA. STAT. §447.501(l)(c) (Supp. 1974), which provides: "(1) Public Employers
or their agents or representatives are prohibited from: ... (C) Refusing to bargain collectively, failing to bargain collectively in good faith, or refusing to sign a final agreement
agreed upon with the certified bargaining agent for the public employees in the bargaining
unit." See also FLA. STAT. §§447.203(14), .809 (Supp. 1974).
40. Dismissal Report, City of Winter Park, Case No. 8H-CA-756-2019 (March 3,1975), at
2-3.
41. Id.
42. See FLA. STAT. §447.503(3) (Supp. 1974).
43. Reinstatement of Unfair Labor Practice Charge Order, Case No. 8H-CA-756-2019
(June 10, 1975).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§151-68 (1970).
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bargaining rights of private sector workers since 1935. For this reason, the
procedures and substantive principles that have evolved under the NLRA
frequently have provided significant guidance in interpreting and applying
such public sector labor laws. 45 Furthermore, since the relevant representation 4 G and unfair labor practice4 7 provisions of the Florida PERA are very
similar to the corresponding sections of the NLRA, it would be beneficial to
consider the decisional rules that have developed in private sector labor relations.
Although the NLRA specifically provides that only through an election
may a labor organization be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees comprising an appropriate negotiating unit,4 8 this is not the
only manner by which a union may become a legally recognized exclusive
bargaining agent. In addition to obtaining NLRB certification through a
secret ballot election, an employee organization may achieve exclusive representative bargaining status in two other ways: (1) where an employer voluntarily recognizes the union as the bargaining representative of the employees
in an appropriate unit, where a majority of such employees have selected that
labor organization as their negotiating agent through the execution of authorization cards; or (2) where the NLRB determines that an employer has committed unfair labor practices precluding a fair representation election and
undermining the organizing union's previously obtained majority support, and
orders the offending employer to recognize the labor organization involved as
the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in the appropriate unit affected, in order to remedy effectively the labor act violation that the employer committed. 49 A comparison of the pertinent PERA and NLRA provisions would certainly indicate that relatively analogous methods for obtaining representation rights should be available to labor organizations seeking to
represent public employees in Florida, since many of the doctrines established
under the NLRA are relevant to situations arising under the PERA.

45. See cases cited note 20 supra.

46.

Compare Fla. Stat. §447.307 (Supp. 1974), with 29 U.S.C. §159 (1970). Compare FLA.
§§447.203(14), .309(1), .501(l)(c), .501(2)(c) (Supp. 1974), with 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(5),
(b)(3), (d) (1970) (regarding the duty to bargain in good faith with the duly selected negotiating agent concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment).
47. Compare FLA. STAT. §§447.501(1), (2) (Supp. 1974), with 29 U.S.C. §§158(a), (b)
(1970) (regarding the specific unfair labor practice provisions in the respective enactments);
Compare FLA. STAT. §447.501(3) (Supp. 1974), with 29 U.S.C. §158(c) (1970) (regarding the
specifically protected right of free speech, despite the general unfair labor practice provisions

STAT.

in the respective enactments).

48. See 29 U.S.C. §§159(c), (e) (1970), which provide for certification only where a union
has won an NLRB conducted representation election.
49. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-16 (1969), and cases cited therein.
Once a labor organization has obtained exclusive representative status, the employer is obligated to continue to recognize that organization for a reasonable period of time-usually
considered to-be twelve months. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1968); Universal Gear Serv. Corp., 157 N.L.R.B.
1169 (1966), enforced, 394 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1968).
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RepresentativeStatus Through Voluntary Recognition
Obligation of Employer Presented with Request for Recognition. Once a
union seeking representation rights under the NLRA has obtained authorization cards signed by a majority of employees 0 in a proposed bargaining unit,
it may request that the employer voluntarily accord it recognition. If the employer is satisfied that the requesting labor organization in fact enjoys majority support-' and agrees that the proposed unit is appropriate, it may voluntarily recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workers in that unit. However, the employer is not legally obligated by the
NLRA to accede to the labor organization's request, nor is it even required to
petition the NLRB for a representation election. 52 It may simply reject the
union's demand and do nothing. Unless the employer engages "in an unfair
labor practice that impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization
cards purporting to represent a majority of the employees, which is refused
recognition, has the burden of taking the next step in invoking the [National
Labor Relations] Board's election procedure." 53 The PERA, on the other
hand, arguably has rejected this approach by imposing an affirmative duty
upon public employers that are presented with a request for voluntary recognition by a labor organization.
Section 447.307(1) of the PERA specifically provides:
50. Authorization cards are valid if they are: (1) signed by employees in the proposed
bargaining unit; (2) dated; (3) unambiguous in designating the union in question as exclusive bargaining agent; (4) not restricted to a nonbargaining purpose, such as merely indicating the desire for a representation election without unequivocally and presently obligating the signers to the union as their negotiating representative; and (5) not obtained
through coercion or objectively demonstrable and material misrepresentation. See John
Barnes Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 911 (1970); Marie Phillips, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 340 (1969); C. E.
Collins, 177 N.L.R.B. 221 (1969); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963). See
generally Welles, The Obligation To Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. Rv.
349 (1969); Note, Union Authorization Cards,75 YALE LJ.805 (1966).

It should be noted that for majority recognition purposes, the NLR.B will generally accept other forms of employee commitment, such as a union membership card, NLR.B v.
Federbrush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d 1941); an application for union membership, NLRB v.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1940); or a union dues checkoff authorization card, Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 659 (1942). However, in the public sector where many organizations presently vying
for representation rights have traditionally existed as professional societies, which were
joined by many persons for occupational and social reasons wholly unrelated to collective
bargaining considerations, it would generally be preferable to require unambiguous authorization cards as evidence of support for an employee organization's representative status,
rather than such other equivocal indicators of employee sentiment. But see McGuire, supra
note 2, at 65 n.133.
51. See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra regarding the unfair labor practice liabilities
involved when an employer accords exclusive representative status to a minority union.
52. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §159(c)(1)(B) (1970).
53. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974). However, if
the employer utilizes independent means to verify objectively the requesting union's assertion of majority support, it may thereby obligate itself to grant voluntary recognition if
the evidence dearly establishes the truth of the majority claim. See Sullivan Elec. Co., 199
N.L.R.B. 809 (1972); Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B, 329 (1970); Dixon Ford Shoe
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Any employee organization which is designated or selected by a majority of public employees in an appropriate unit as their representative
for purposes of collective bargaining shall request recognition by the
public employer. The public employer shall, if satisfied as to the majority status of the employee organization and the appropriateness of
the proposed unit, recognize the employee organization as the collective
bargaining representative of employees in the designated unit.54
The seemingly mandatory nature of the emphasized language would appear
to be an effort by the Florida Legislature to obviate the necessity of time-consuming and expensive representation elections in most instances where employee organizations claim to possess majority support.
When a union seeking representation rights has obtained authorization
cards from a majority of the employees in a proposed unit, the first sentence of
section 447.307(1) would clearly obligate it to request voluntary recognition
from the public employer involved. This was the holding in G. Pierce Wood
State Mental Hospital55 Once the union has requested voluntary recognition, it could be argued that the second sentence of section 447.307(1)
would then impose upon the affected public employer an affirmative duty to
ascertain both the correctness of the labor organization's majority claim and
the appropriateness of the proposed unit. Such a statutory interpretation presumably would obligate the employer to make an expeditious and reasonably
thorough investigation of the relevant circumstances surrounding the union's
claim56 At the completion of such an undertaking,57 the employer would
presumably be bound by its conclusions. If it were to ascertain that the requesting union in fact enjoyed majority support among the employees in a
proposed unit that the employer determined was appropriate for bargaining

purposes, the employer would be legally required to extend voluntary recognition to that labor organization and the union could then petition PERC for
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 861 (1965); Kellogg Mills, 147 N.L.R.B. 342, 345 (1964); Snow & Sons, 134
N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, supra at 310 n.10.
54. FLA. STAT. §447.307(1) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
55. Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975); see notes 22-37 supra and accompanying text.
56. If the employer were to endeavor to evaluate the actual extent of union support by
polling the employees in the proposed unit, it should reasonably be expected to follow the
safeguards established by the NLRB regarding such employee polls to prevent undue intimidation or coercion of workers: (1) The purpose of the poll must be to determine the truth
of the union's claim of majority status; (2) this purpose must be communicated to the employees; (3) assurances against any reprisals being taken must be given to the employees;
(4) the employees must be polled by secret ballot to preserve the anonymity of union supporters; and (5) the employer must not engage in contemporaneous unfair labor practices
or otherwise create a coercive atmosphere that would impermissibly inhibit union support
or activity. Northeastern Dye Works, 83 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1973); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165
N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). See also Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). Cf. General Mercantile Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1972); Bourne v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964).
57. Under this approach the failure of the public employer to make a good faith investigation of the union's claim would likely constitute a violation of the PERA. See FLA.
STAT. §§447.501(1)(a), (c) (Supp. 1974).
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certification.58 On the other hand, were the employer either to question the
employee organization's claim of majority support or challenge the appropriateness of the proposed unit, the union, in the absence of employer unfair
labor practices precluding the holding of a fair representation election,5 9
would be forced to invoke the certification election authority of PERC.60
However, while an interpretation imposing such a substantial affirmative
burden upon public employers presented with recognition demands might
initially be appealing, other considerations militate in favor of a less obligatory approach.
If public employers were affirmatively required to investigate thoroughly
the propriety of every recognition claim they received, substantial problems
would undoubtedly develop. While endeavoring to ascertain true employee
sentiment regarding the union presenting the recognition demand, many unsophisticated employers would likely utilize techniques that might well constitute technical violations of the strict rules established to protect employees
from intimidating or coercive questioning concerning their opinions regarding
a labor organization.6 In addition, in those instances where an employer decided to decline a union's request for recognition, it might be presented with
an unfair labor practice charge that it had not utilized sufficiently thorough
investigatory techniques or that it had challenged the appropriateness of the
proposed bargaining unit in bad faith.62 In such situations, the resulting
litigation would be expensive and undoubtedly more protracted than the
procedure required to conduct a regular PERC certification election. Futhermore, while it might be argued that a public employer easily could avert these
difficulties by merely examining the authorization cards presented by the labor
organization and comparing the number of such cards with the total complement of employees in the proposed unit, this approach might fail to protect
fully the rights of the workers. It would mandate the certification of a labor
organization based solely upon authorization cards, which are sometimes executed by employees because of social pressure, union misrepresentations,es or
58. See FLA. STAT. §447.307(1) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra. Pursuant to this
certification procedure, PERC is authorized to consider only the appropriateness of the
unit agreed upon by the union and employers. But see text accompanying notes 70-75 infra
regarding the legal consequences occasioned by the voluntary grant of recognition by an
employer to a labor organization that does not in fact enjoy majority support.
59. See text accompanying notes 112-128 infra, regarding the legal effect of employer unfair labor practices that would prevent a fair election.
60. See FLA. STAT. §§477.307(2), (3) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra. Regarding
the certification election procedures prescribed by the PERA, see text accompanying notes
90-112 infra.
61. See note 56 supra regarding the strict rules that have evolved under the NLRA
pertaining to this area. It should also be noted that an approach imposing such an affimative
investigative duty upon public employers would place an extreme burden upon governmental
entities employing large numbers of workers, particularly where they work at various facilities
located in different geographical regions.
62. See note 57 supra.
63. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602-03 (1969); Marie Phillips, Inc.,
178 N.L.R.B. 340 (1969), enforced, 443 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cumberland Shoe Corp.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
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even actual coercion. Recognizing these realities, the United States Supreme
Court has clearly indicated that a secret ballot representation election, which
is generally free from such pressures, is the preferred method for safeguarding
the rights of employees.64
The problems that would be created by a statutory interpretation imposing
a substantial affirmative investigatory obligation upon public employers presented with recognition demands could best be avoided by adopting an approach analogous to that currently followed-s under the NLRA. 6 6 Once a
public employer is presented with a request for recognition by a labor organization claiming majority support in a proposed bargaining unit, that employer
should have two alternatives open to it. If it so desires, the employer should
be permitted merely to decline the union's request, thereby forcing the union
67
to seek a PERC certification election should it desire to pursue the matter.
So long as the employer does not commit subsequent unfair labor practices

64. See NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 603 (1969). It is informative to note
that the original NLRA permitted the Labor Board to base its certification of a labor union
upon either a secret ballot election or majority support established by "any other suitable
method." 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935). However, recognizing the preferability of secret ballot
elections, Congress amended the Act in 1947 to permit certification to be based only upon
the results of a representative election. 61 Stat. 136, 144 (1947); 29 U.S.C. §§159(c), (e) (1970).
Although it is certainly true that an employer could itself eliminate the problems created
by reliance upon authorization cards by conducting its own secret ballot election, it would
certainly be better to have such an election conducted under the auspices of PERC, since
no significant delay would necessarily be involved and the statutory rights of all of the interested parties would be optimally protected.
65. Although the NLRB had initially established a rule requiring an employer to
accede to a union's request for recognition in the absence of a good faith doubt concerning
the propriety of the labor organization's claim to majority status, it increasingly recognized
that it would be preferable to eschew such a subjective test in favor of the relatively objective approach presently followed, which is much easier to administer and which it believes best effectuates the purposes of the NLRA. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co.,
190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), aff'd, 419 U.S. 301 (1974); Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077
(1966); Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B.
1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). See
generally Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority,
16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965); Note, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under §8(aX5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 387 (1966). For a discussion of
the post-Gissel Packing rules, see Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith
Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CHi. L.
REv. 411 (1970).
66. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. It should be emphasized that nothing
in the specific language of §447.307(1) of the PERA clearly imposes such a heavy affirmative
obligation upon public employers, thus it would in no way do violence to that provision to
interpret it in a manner consistent with the practice presently followed under the corresponding NLRA section. See 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1970).
67. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). This would
not impose any significant burden upon the requesting union, since it would surely possess
authorization cards signed by over 30% of the employees in the proposed unit. See FLA. STAT.
§447.307(2) (Supp. 1974). Furthermore, except in unusual cases, PERC would be able to
have a certification election expeditiously conducted, which would normally resolve the entire
representation issue.
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that would preclude the holding of a fair representation election, 68 it
should be entitled to withhold any recognition of a bargaining representative
until a labor organization has been certified by PERG as the winner of a
properly conducted certification election.6 9 On the other hand, were the public
employer to be satisfied that the requesting union actually possesses majority
support with respect to a proposed unit that the employer agrees would be
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, it would be free to accord that
labor organization immediate voluntary recognition. However, before extending such recognition to an employee organization, the public employer should
be certain that the requesting organization in fact enjoys majority support.
Extension of Recognition to Minority Unions. In International Ladies
Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,-a the United States Supreme Court held
that, where an employer granted exclusive recognition to a labor organization that did not actually possess majority support among the employees in
the proposed unit at the time recognition was extended, both the employer
and the union comYitted unfair labor practices.7l The Court indicated that
the good faith belief of both the employer and the union that the labor organization enjoyed majority status at the time representation rights were
granted was irrelevant, since the infringement of employee rights concomitant
with the extension of recognition to a union that did not in fact possess majority support constituted a per se violation of the NLRA.72 Thus neither
good faith nor honesty of purpose could excuse the parties' improper conduct.
Furthermore, the fact that the union had obtained actual majority support
soon after it had received recognition was similarly no defense, since the attainment of such majority status could well have resulted from the impermissible advantage that had been provided to it by the premature extension of
exclusive representation rights.73
It should be noted that this is the approach recommended by the Office of the PERC
General Counsel. See Dismissal Report, City of Winter Park, Case No. 8H-CA-756-2019
(March 3, 1975). However, on June 10, 1975, the Commission reversed the dismissal recommendation of the General Counsel and ordered the refusal to bargain unfair labor practice
charge reinstated, thus indicating that PERC would prefer to consider the entire matter
before deciding whether to accept either the NLRA approach, or the affirmative obligation
concept suggested by the charging labor 'organization. Unfair Labor Practice Charge Reinstatement Order, City of Winter Park; Case No. 8H-CA-756-2019 (June 10, 1975). See text
accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
1 68. See text accompanying notes 7680 infra regarding the rules applicable to the situation where an employer actually commits unfair labor practices affecting a labor union's
organizing efforts.
69. See 'text accompanying notes 90-112 infra regarding certification election procedures
under the PERA. Support for the interpretation proposed herein is found in McGuire, supra
note 2, at 61, 66.

70. 366 US. 731 (1961).
71. The employer's conduct constituted a violation of §§8(a)(1), (2) of the NLRA, while
the union was culpable under §8(b)(1)(A).
72.' 366 U.S. af -37-39.
73. Id. at 736. For NLRB decisions finding unfair labor practice violations in cases involving similar circumstances, see Lion Country Safari, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1972); Ellery
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Since the language contained in the pertinent sections of the PERA is, in
all relevant aspects the same as that found in the corresponding NLRA provisions,74 it would reasonably appear that a public employer acts at its peril
in extending voluntary recognition to a labor organization where it has not
been conclusively established that the union actually enjoys majority support
among the employees in the proposed bargaining unity Nevertheless, where
a public employer has carefully satisfied itself that a union's claim of majority status is well-founded, it may, if it desires, accord voluntary recognition
to it, and the union may then petition the PERC for certification.
Recognition-CertificationProcedure Before PERC. Under the recognitioncertification procedure of section 447.307(1),76 PERC is empowered only to
review the appropriateness of the unit agreed upon by the public employer
and the recognized labor organization.7 Furthermore, a literal reading of that
provision would appear to require the Commission either to accept and certify
the actual unit stipulated by the parties, should it find the unit appropriate,
or reject the certification petition entirely, should it determine that the agreed
upon unit is inappropriate. However, such an "all or nothing" approach
should be eschewed in favor of a more reasonable alternative that would not
do violence to the legislative intent expressed in section 447.307(1).
If PERC were to conclude that a technically inappropriate proposed unit
would become appropriate if it were modified slightly, it should certainly be
empowered to certify the petitioning union with respect to the modified unit,
assuming, of course, that its majority status remains intact.78 If the public
employer had no objection to the slight alteration of the proposed unit, this
procedure would eliminate the need for a time-consuming repetition of the
formal recognition-certification procedural steps.7 9 On the other hand, even if
Prods. Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1964); Kenrich Petrochems., Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910
(1964); Sinko Mfg. &Tool Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 201 (1964).
74. Compare FLA. STAT. §§4t7.501(1)(a), (e), (2)(a) (Supp. 1974), with §§8(a)(1), (2),
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.
75. Extreme circumspection would certainly be required where more than one labor
union is engaging in simultaneous organizing efforts regarding the same employees, since it
is generally considered to constitute an unfair labor practice where an employer extends
recognition to one of several competing unions. In such cases, a real question concerning
representation is deemed to exist, which can reasonably be resolved only through resort to
the certification election process. See Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958); Midwest
Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); cf. Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264
F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
76. See FLA. STAT. §447.307(1) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra.
77. But see text accompanying notes 70-75 supra, regarding the unfair labor practice
liabilities pertaining to the grant of exclusive representation status to a union that does not
actually enjoy majority support.
78. See McGuire, supra note 2, at 69 n.213. PERC has apparently decided to follow this
course of action. See City of Titusville, Case No. 8H-RA-756-2090, Dec. No. 75C-73-108 (July
2, 1975).
79. See 2 FLA. ADMIN. COD: 8H-2.01-.06. An additional caveat relating to PERC's
processing of recognition-certification petitions should be noted. Although the PERA specifically limits the Commission's function with respect to such petitions to a review of the
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the employer were not satisfied with the modified unit, it would not have any
bona fide basis for complaining to the PERC about its certification order, since
the labor organization would still enjoy clear and indisputable majority support 80 over a unit found by the Commission to be appropriate. The prior unit
determination decision would be res judicata with respect to PERC itself, and
the public employer, if it desired to contest the decision, would be forced to
seek judicial review by a district court of appeal.
JudicialReview of PERC CertificationDeterminations. Section 447.503(7)
of the PERASi provides in relevant part:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the commission granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought, may obtain a review of
such order by filing in the appropriate district court of appeal a petition
praying that the order of the commission be modified or set aside.
Although it might initially appear that this provision would grant a public
employer dissatisfied with a PERC certification decision the right to direct
judicial appeal, a careful examination of the section indicates that such direct
appellate review is not available.
It is important to recognize that the judicial review provision is part of the
over-all section pertaining to "charges of unfair labor practices."8 2 Furtherappropriateness of the proposed units (see note 76 supra and accompanying text) there may
well be a situation that would require the consideration of other fundamental principles. If
while a properly filed recognition-certification petition were pending, a petition seeking a
secret ballot representation election was timely filed by a competing labor organization seeking to represent the same group of employees and that was accompanied by a requisite 30%
showing-of-interest (see note 92 infra and accompanying text), the Commission probably
should dismiss the recognition-certification petition and process the election-certification
petition instead. The filing of the latter petition by the competing union would certainly
be sufficient to indicate that a real question concerning representation existed that only
could be fairly resolved through a secret ballot election (see note 75 supra). The labor organization that initially filed the recognition-certification petition would surely have sufficient support to intervene in the resulting representation proceeding, thus guaranteeing all
employees a fair opportunity to select the true representative of their choice. If, on the
other hand, PERC were merely to continue to process the prior recognition-certification
petition, ignoring the competing election-certification petition, it would create the substantial risk that the Commission would inadvertently become involved in a situation where
it might improperly grant certification to a union when it was not sufficiently clear that it
in fact enjoyed majority support (see discussion notes 70-75 supra). However, if the subsequent election-certification petition were not filed until after PERC had processed the prior
recognition-certification petition and had extended certification to the specified labor organization, the election-certification petition should then be dismissed due to the elevenmonth bar contained in the Commission rules. 2 FLA. ADMIN. CoDE 8H-3.3(a).
80. Since the public employer would have itself already independently verified the clear
majority status of the union before initially agreeing to grant it recognition, it would most
likely constitute an unlawful refusal to bargain were the employer to deny the labor organization representation status with respect to the slightly modified unit based upon an alleged
doubt as to the majority support issue. See cases cited note 53 supra.
81.

See also FLA. STAT. §447.503(5) (Supp. 1974).

82. See FLA. STAT. §447.503 (Supp. 1974).
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more, appeal is granted only with respect to a "final order of the commission."
Although sections 447.503(4)(a) and (b),1 which define the unfair labor practice authority of PERC, specify that at the conclusion of any such proceeding the Commission shall cause to be issued "an order" either remedying unfair labor practice violations or dismissing the charge if no such violations are
found, the PERC is not empowered to issue "orders" under the PERA certification provisions. Sections 447.307(1) and (3)(b)4 specifically authorize only
the issuance of a "certification." It clearly appears that the legislature intended
to permit only direct judicial review of final PERC orders pertaining to unfair labor practice cases.8 5 Since the PERA conspicuously eschews the term
"order" with respect to certification decisions, no such direct court appeal
would be available regarding such decisionss6
A public employer that desires judicial review of representation issues
raised in a certification case would generally have to refuse to bargain with
the certified labor organization to achieve its goal. 87 The Commission would
most likely consider its prior representation determination to be res judicata
with respect to the case, s and expeditiously issue an unfair labor practice
order, from which the employer could then obtain direct appellate review.8 9
Although this rather convoluted appeal procedure might appear to some to be
unreasonably cumbersome, it does provide public employers with court review
of representation determinations that they strongly oppose, while simultaneously encouraging parties to accept the decisions of PERC in most instances,
thereby avoiding needless delays before bona fide collective bargaining can
commence.
83. FLA. STAT. §§447.503(4)(a), (b) (Supp. 1974), provide in relevant part:
"(a) If . . . the commission finds substantial evidence that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, then it shall state its findings of fact and issue and cause to be served an
order requiring the respondent party to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice ....
"(b) If . . . the commission finds that the person or entity named in the charge has not
engaged in and is not engaging in the unfair labor practice, the commission shall state its
findings of fact and issue an order dismissing the charge." (emphasis added).
84. See FLA. STAT. §§447.307(1), (3)(b) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra.
85.

Although the legislative history does not clearly disclose the precise reason for the

distinction between unfair labor practice and certification cases, it may well have been
premised upon the desire to expedite certification procedures by generally precluding protracted judicial review of such PERC determinations.
86. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of the analysis set
forth herein. It has specifically interpreted §10(f) of the NLRA, which utilizes language almost identical to that found in §447.503(7) of the PERA to define the scope of judicial review of "final orders" of the NLRB, as only permitting direct review of unfair labor practice decisions, and not of representation determinations. See American Fed'n of Labor v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). But see Minnesota State College Bd. v. PERB, 89 L.R.R.M.

2833 (Minn. 1975).
87. Only where PERC issues a certification decision that clearly violates an express provision of the PERA should direct resort to a judicial tribunal be permitted. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).

88. Cf. NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 401 U.S. 137 (1971).
89. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 5, at 887. Unfortunately, no similar procedure
would be available to labor organizations that desired judicial review of PERC representation decisions with which they did not agree.
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Representation Status Through a CertificationElection
If a labor organization is unable to utilize the recognition-certification
procedures available under the PERA because it has not obtained the required voluntary recognition from the public employer, 90 it can alternatively
seek certification by petitioning the PERC for a secret ballot representation
election. 93 To obtain-such an election, the union would first have to satisfy
several statutory prerequisites.
General Prerequisitesto Filing of Election Petition. A petition seeking a
certification election will only be considered by PERC where it is filed in
a timely manner and is accompanied by properly executed authorization cards
signed by at least 30 per cent of the employees in the unit for which the union
is seeking certification.92 If a valid representation election covering the employees in the unit for which certification is currently being sought 93 has been
conducted during the past year, the petition may not be filed prior to eleven
months from the date of that election,9 4 and no election may be held until
twelve months have elapsed.9 5 Furthermore, if another labor organization currently representing the employees in the proposed unit has already negotiated
a collective bargaining agreement covering such employees, that contract will
generally- preclude the filing of a certification election petition until the last
90 to 150 days before its expiration date.9 7 In order to permit the present
90. See text accompanying notes 50-69 supra.
91. See FLA. STAT. § §447.307(2), (3) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra.
92. See FLA. STAT. §447.307(2) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra. It should also
be noted that any labor organization that desires recognition or certification status under the
PERA must previously have satisfied the registration requirements of FLA. STAT. §447.305
(Supp. 1974).
93. PERC should follow the NLRB practice of applying only the prior election bar
rule to the situation where the election being sought would involve either the same unit
covered by the prior representation election or a subdivision thereof. A prior election in a
given unit should not preclude an election within one year covering a broader, more inclusive unit, since it would not be appropriate to deny those who did not have the opportunity to vote in the prior election the chance to have an immediate representation election.
See Robertson Bros. Dep't Store, Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 271 (1951); AmERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra
note 5, at 164.
94. 2 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 8H-3.3(a).
95. See FLA. STAT. §447.307(3)(d) (Supp. 1974), set forth in note 16 supra. It should be
noted, however, that an election conducted within the preceding year would not prevent a
public employer from presently extending voluntary recognition to a requesting labor organization, since the twelve-month statutory bar pertains only to the holding of another
election. Cf. Concren, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 592 (1966), enforced, 368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 974 (1967).

96. If the existing contract contained a clearly illegal union dues checkoff provision, cf.
Gary Steel Supply Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 470 (1963), or provided for illegal forms of discrimination, cf. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962), it should not be permitted to operate as a
bar to an election petition. However, the mere inclusion of an illegal clause that does not
act as a restraint upon the labor rights of employees should not ipso facto disqualify the
contract as a bar. Cf. Food Haulers, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 394 (1962).
97. 2 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 8H-3.3(b). No collective bargaining agreement may provide for
a term of existence exceeding three years. See FLA. STAT. §447.309(5) (Supp. 1974).
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parties to have the opportunity to negotiate a new contract without the disruptive influence of a competing union, no election petition may be filed
during the last 90 days of a collective bargaining agreement.98 However, if the
existing agreement expires without a new contract being negotiated, a petition
may then be filed any time prior to the execution of a new agreement. 99
Prerequisite Obligations of Majority and Minority Petitioners. PERG has
decided that different petition prerequisites pertain to labor organizations, depending upon whether they possess majority employee support in their proposed units at the time their election petitions are filed. 10 If a union enjoying
majority support does not request voluntary recognition from the public employer involved prior to the time it files its election petition, the Commission
will dismiss the petition as it did in the G. Pierce Wood State Mental Hospital
case. 101 However, if the petitioning labor organization possesses only minority
2
support, no such prerequisite is to be imposed.10

The doctrine announced by PERC is clearly supported by the relevant
language of sections 447.307(1) and (2). Section 447.307(1) expressly provides:
"Any employee organization which is designated or selected by a majority of
public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit as their representative for
purposes of collective bargaining shall request recognition by the public employer." Furthermore, section 447.307(2) provides: "If the public employer
refuses to recognize the employee organization the employee organization may
file a petition" for a certification election. The inescapable conclusion to be
drawn from this language is that once a labor organization obtains majority
support with respect to a proposed unit, it must first request voluntary recognition from the relevant public employer and have that request be denied
before it can properly petition for a certification election. 10 However, while
PERC's enunciated policy does conform to the strict statutory language, it
might be appropriate for it to consider a slight alteration of its rule regarding
98. It should be noted, however, that if an election petition were timely filed during the
ninety- to one-hundred-fifty-day period preceding the expiration date of an existing collective bargaining contract, the public employer should not be permitted thereafter to negotiate
with the incumbent labor organization concerning a new agreement until the question concerning representation raised by the petition of the competing union has been definitively
resolved. Cf. Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958). Nevertheless, the incumbent union
should still be allowed to continue administering the existing agreement.
99. Cf. Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).

100. See text accompanying notes 22-37 supra.
101.

Dec. No. 75E-4-26 (April 15, 1975).

102. State of Florida, Sumter Correctional Institution, Dec. No. 75E-3-24 (April 22, 1975).
The petitioner would, of course, still have to demonstrate at least 30% support. See note 92

supra and accompanying text.
103. Since the number of employees in a proposed unit could easily be ascertained by
an inspection of the public personnel records of the governmental entity involved, a labor
organization could definitively know whether it possessed majority support, except in the
unusual situation where it possessed only authorization cards signed by approximately 50%

of the workers in a proposed unit and it was not sure which workers might be excludable
from the unit because of their managerial or confidential status. See FLA. STAT. §§447.203(3)-(5)
(Supp. 1974).
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majority unions that would ameliorate the time-consuming effects of the
present doctrine while still effectively accomplishing the objective apparently
intended by the legislature.04
PERC should consider following the general doctrine established under
the NLRA, which treats the filing of a representation election petition as an
automatic request for employer recognition. 105 Pursuant to the Florida public
documents lawlor the governmental employer could then examine the authorization cards filed by the union with PERC. If the employer does not, within
a reasonable period of time, grant voluntary recognition to the petitioning
labor organization, the Commission could consider the constructive recognition request as having been denied, and could then proceed with its processing
of the election petition. This would avoid needless waste of valuable time and
eliminate the necessity of requiring the union to repeat the entire election
petition procedure. Nevertheless, no such problem should be encountered by
a petitioning minority union.
Since a minority union would not be "designated or selected by a majority
of public employees in an appropriate unit," the recognition request requirement of section 447.307(1) would be inapplicable with respect to such a union,
g
However, since secas PERC recognized in Sumter CorrectionalInstitution.M
tion 447.807(2) seems to imply that a labor organization must be refused recognition by an employer before it may petition for a certification election, one
must still consider whether an unsuccessful demand for recognition should be
a sine qua non to the filing of a representation election petition by even a
minority union. 08 Although the mere request for exclusive recognition by a
labor organization not enjoying majority support might not constitute an unfair labor practice,09 it would clearly be unlawful both for an employer to
accede to such a request and for the requesting minority union to accept such
recognition."10 Thus, if a denial by a public employer of a request for recogni104. Presumably the legislature desired to obviate the necessity of a certification election
where the organizing labor union and the public employer both agreed that the union
possessed clear majority support in a concededly appropriate bargaining unit.
105. See "M" System, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1316 (1956). See also, §9(c)(l)(A) of the NLRA,
which imposes a similar requirement that a union first unsuccessfully request recognition
before it files an election petition.
106. See FLA. STAT. §§119.01-.10 (1973).
107. State of Florida, Sumter Correctional Institution, Dec. No. 75E-3-25 (April 22, 1975);
see text accompanying notes 22-37 supra.
108. Although it might be possible to argue that by reading §§447.307(1) and (2) of the
PERA in conjunction, one might discern a legislative desire to permit only unions possessing
majority support to petition PERC for certification elections, such a statutory interpretation
should be rejected. It would appear to ignore entirely the 30% showing-of-interest requirement of §447.307(2), for if only majority unions were supposed to be able to petition for
elections, surely a 500 showing-of-interest would have been required. Therefore, to avoid
the undesirable prospect of rendering the 300 language mere surplusage, it would be
reasonable to assume that the legislature contemplated that minority unions that possessed
at least 30% support would be allowed to petition for elections. See McGuire, supra note 2,
at 71-72.
109. See NLRB v. Drivers, Chaufferus, Helpers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
110. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); see
text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
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tion were a prerequisite to the filing of an election petition by even a minority
labor organization, the implication would be that the legislature intended for
such a minority union to request that the public employer join it in committing an unfair labor practice. Surely such an absurd result could not have
been contemplated by the legislature.11' Therefore, a prior unsuccessful recognition request should not be considered a statutory prerequisite to the filing
12
of a certification election petition by a minority union,
Representation Status Through an Unfair Labor PracticeProceeding
Under the NLRA a labor organization does not necessarily have to win a
representation election or be the recipient of voluntary employer recognition
to become the exclusive bargaining representative for employees constituting
an appropriate unit. It has been traditionally recognized that a labor union
could obtain exclusive representative status through an unfair labor practice
proceeding culminating in an order requiring an offending employer to recognize and bargain with an adversely affected union in order to rectify the improper effects of the unlawful employer practices. For many years, in such
cases, the NLRB utilized evaluative techniques that focused primarily upon
the subjective intent of the employer involved. If an employer refused to grant
recognition to a union claiming majority support for the bad faith purpose of
thereafter dissipating its employee support, the Labor Board would issue a
remedial bargaining order to prevent the employer from benefiting from its
unlawful conduct."' However, in recent years the NLRB has favored an approach that objectively evaluates the effects of an employer's unfair labor
practices upon the representation election process and the United States
Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned this method for resolving such cases.
When an employer is presented with a request for voluntary recognition
from a labor organization asserting majority support, it is not legally required
to accede to that request. In fact, not only may the employer reject the request,
but it may thereafter do nothing, thus forcing the requesting union to file a
4
representation election petition with the NLRB." However, if the employer
ill. While a union lacking majority support could avoid this problem by informing
the public employer at the time of its recognition request of its minority status, such a procedure would certainly be a fruitless and unnecessarily time-consuming endeavor.
112. Although the PERC election procedures are fairly straightforward, brief mention
should be made of the fact that ihe Commission currently requires the public employer and
the petitioning labor organization to split the costs of the certification election, 2 FLA. ADnMIN.
CODE 8H-3.29. Since it is the Commission that is directed to effectuate the administrative
provisions of the PERA election process and not the parties themselves, this requirement
may well constitute action in excess of PERC's authority. It might further constitute an
impermissible monetary impediment to the exercise by public employees of their Florida
constitutional right to select representatives for collective bargaining purposes. To alleviate this unfortunate circumstance, the legislature should endeavor to increase the Commission budget sufficiently to enable it to carry out its statutory duties without having to
depend upon monetary support from the parties invoking its assistance.
113. See citations note 65 supra. See generally Lesnick, Establishment of Collective
BargainingRights Without an Election, 65 MieH. L. REV. 851 (1967).
114. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). See also
notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
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subsequently commits unfair labor practices, it may thereby forfeit its right
to have the representation question resolved through a secret ballot election
by subjecting itself to the possibility of becoming the object of an NLRB
remedial bargaining order obligating it to recognize the union immediately" 15
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co." 8G the United States Supreme Court recognized the propriety of the NLRB's practice of dividing employer unfair
labor practices into three categories in determining whether it would be appropriate to order an offending employer to recognize and bargain with the
affected labor organization. Where the employer unfair labor practices are
relatively minor, with a minimal impact upon the free choice of the employees
involved, the Labor Board will refuse to issue a bargaining order, since its
usual cease-and-desist authority should be sufficient to remedy adequately the
7
unlawful practices and permit the holding of a fair representation election."1
On the other hand, where the employer violations are sufficiently opprobrious
to undermine the majority support already obtained by the adversely affected
labor organization and to interfere significantly with the NLRB election
process, a bargaining order may be utilized.
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past
[employer unfair labor] practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a
fair rerun)"18 by -the use of traditional remedies, though present, is
slight and" that employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such
an order should issue.119
The Gissel Packing Court also indicated that in extreme cases involving "outrageous" and "pervasive" employer unfair labor practices that could not beameliorated through the application of regular remedies,. with the result that
no fair and reliable election could possibly be conducted, -a bargaining order.
might be issued without even inquiring into die question .of whether the-I
0
.
union ever actually enjoyed majority support.2.
- -

115. -See -NLRR v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See- geterally. Platt,-The"
Supreme Court Looks at Bargaining Orders Based on Authorization Cards, 6 GA. L. Rsxv.
779 (1970); Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing: Bargaining Orders and Employee Free- Choice,

45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 318 (1970).
116. 595 U.S. 575 (1969).
117. Id.at 615.
118. Even where a representation election has been conducted that the petitioning
union lost, a bargaining order in its favor may still be issued if the labor organization has
filed proper objections to the election alleging unlawful employer practices that are both
sufficient to cause the prior election to be set aside and of such magnitude as to convince
the Labor Board that a bargaining order should be issued to protect the statutory rights of
the employees involved. See Photobell Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 738 (1966); cf. Pure Chem. Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B. 681 (1971); Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced, 550 F.2d
176 (2d Cir. 1965).
119. 395 U.S. at 614-15. Such a bargaining order is considered appropriate only where
it is established that at one time the labor organization actually possessed majority support.
Id. at 614.
120. 595 U.S. at 613-14; see, e.g., J. P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971). It is apparently presumed in such extraordinary cases that.
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When deciding whether employer unfair labor practices have been so substantial as to preclude the holding of a fair representation election, the NLRB
generally considers the circumstances and atmosphere as they existed at the
time of the unlawful conduct, rather than considering subsequent occurrences
that might have ameliorated the adverse effects of such practices and thus
might inure to the wrongdoer's benefit.12 1 However, several circuit courts have

disagreed with this approach, contending that no bargaining order should
issue unless the NLRB has concluded that at the time such order is issued,
the electoral atmosphere is such as to preclude the likelihood of a fair election. 122 Although the Labor Board practice of focusing upon circumstances
existing at the time of the commission of the employer unfair labor practices
perhaps ignores the preference for secret ballot representation elections whenever they can be conducted fairly, 23 it must be recognized that evaluating the
situation at the time the bargaining order would be directed has the effect of
rewarding recalcitrant employers who successfully protract the unfair labor
practice litigation. Nevertheless, the latter approach is the more appropriate,
since the rationale underlying the issuance of a bargaining order is premised
upon the impossibility of conducting a fair representation election. If such an
election can be held at the time a bargaining order is issued, it would negate
this rationale and indicate that the order was really being utilized to punish
the unfair labor practice violator. Since the remedial authority of the NLRB
is generally to be exercised only in a compensatory manner, it would appear
that such a punitive measure would transcend the Labor Board's statutory
24

authorization.1

With the exception of the NLRB's refusal to consider the effect on the
election process of events occurring subsequent to employer unfair labor
practice violations, the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission
should adopt and apply principles similar to those currently used by the
NLRB when determining whether a bargaining order should be utilized to
remedy an employer's practices adversely affecting the right of its employees
to select a bargaining representative. A comparison of the relevant PERA unfair labor practice provisions with their counterparts in the NLRA discloses
the labor organization would certainly have obtained majority support but for the nefarious
acts of the employer.
121. See, e.g., Gibson Prods. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 362 (1970). Accord, New Alaska Dev.
Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. L. B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1969).
The NLRB recently indicated that it would henceforth make bargaining orders retroactive
to the date of the employer unfair labor practices that rendered such remedial action necessary, rather than allowing such orders to be only prospective from the date of their issuance.
Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 89 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1975). Such an approach appropriately permits the affected labor organizations to endeavor through collective bargaining to deprive the recalcitrant employers of the benefit that they might otherwise derive
from tactics intended to postpone improperly the representation rights of their employees.
122. See, e.g., General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 1350 (4th Cir. 1971); NLRB

v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
123. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
124. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 651 (1961); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U..S. 197 (1938).
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that the two enactments are basically identical.125 Furthermore, the remedial
authority of PERC under section 447.503(4)(a)126 is fundamentally the
same as that provided the NLRB under section 10(c) of the NLRA.127 It
would thus seem most reasonable to expect PERC to interpret and apply the
pertinent PERA provisions in a manner consistent with the way in which the
NLRB effectuates the NLRA. For this reason, PERC should be willing to
utilize a remedial bargaining order in most situations in which such an order
would be issued by the NLRB if the offending employer involved were private.
However, to conform to the specific procedural rules of the PERA, the Commission should not issue bargaining orders per se, but rather orders directing
the public employer involved to grant voluntary recognition to the adversely
affected labor organization as bargaining agent for the unit determined by the
Commission to be appropriate. That labor organization could then petition
PERC under section 447.307(1) for certification, and the governmental employer would thereafter be statutorily obligated to negotiate in good faith with
it.128

CONCLUSION

Although the recently enacted PERA provides public employees in Florida
with significant and meaningful organizational and collective bargaining
rights, that enactment unfortunately does not clearly define the exact procedures that an employee organization must utilize to obtain certification as
the exclusive negotiating representative for a group of government workers.
PERC will thus have the important task of interpreting the occasionally
ambiguous PERA provisions in order to determine the procedures that should
be followed. However, the PERA should not be interpreted in a vacuum.
Since its pertinent provisions are analogous to those found in the NLRA, the
Commission should find decisions that have interpreted that federal enactment
to be of persuasive significance.
A labor organization should be able to obtain collective bargaining certification through three alternative methods. If it can convince a public employer that it possesses majority support among the employees in a concededly
appropriate bargaining unit, that employer may accord it voluntary recognition, which it could use to obtain certification. Nevertheless, such a governmental employer should not be statutorily obligated to verify the veracity of a
union's claim to majority status. So long as the employer does not independently ascertain the credibility of the labor organization's majority claim,
it should be permitted to withhold voluntary recognition, thereby forcing that
organization to seek certification through a secret ballot election. However, if
the public employer were to commit unfair labor practices that would have
125.
(1970).

Compare FLA. STAT. §§447.501(l)(a)-(e)

(Supp. 1974), with 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(I)-(5)

126. FLA. STAT. §447.503(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).
127. 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1970).
128. See FLA. STAT. §447.501(l)(c) (Supp. 1974), which makes it an unfair labor practice
for a public employer to fail or refuse to bargain in good faith with the certified representative of its employees.
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the effect of undermining the labor union's majority support and preclude the
likelihood of a fair certification election, PERC should be willing to remedy
the unlawful employer conduct by ordering it to provide voluntary recognition to the aggrieved labor organization. Such recognition would then enable
the union to petition PERG for certification. Such procedures would be
wholly consistent with those that have been adopted under the NLRA, and
they would best effectuate the policies expressed in the PERA.
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